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Abstract. Federated learning (FL) is an emerging distributed machine
learning framework for collaborative model training with a network of
clients (edge devices). FL offers default client privacy by allowing clients
to keep their sensitive data on local devices and to only share local train-
ing parameter updates with the federated server. However, recent studies
have shown that even sharing local parameter updates from a client to
the federated server may be susceptible to gradient leakage attacks and
intrude the client privacy regarding its training data. In this paper, we
present a principled framework for evaluating and comparing different
forms of client privacy leakage attacks. We first provide formal and ex-
perimental analysis to show how adversaries can reconstruct the private
local training data by simply analyzing the shared parameter update
from local training (e.g., local gradient or weight update vector). We
then analyze how different hyperparameter configurations in federated
learning and different settings of the attack algorithm may impact on
both attack effectiveness and attack cost. Our framework also measures,
evaluates, and analyzes the effectiveness of client privacy leakage attacks
under different gradient compression ratios when using communication
efficient FL protocols. Our experiments also include some preliminary
mitigation strategies to highlight the importance of providing a system-
atic attack evaluation framework towards an in-depth understanding of
the various forms of client privacy leakage threats in federated learning
and developing theoretical foundations for attack mitigation.
Keywords: Privacy Leakage Attacks · Federated Learning ·Attack Eval-
uation Framework.
1 Introduction
Federated learning enables the training of a high-quality ML model in a de-
centralized manner over a network of devices with unreliable and intermittent
network connections [37,26,40,19,5,44]. In contrast to the scenario of prediction
on edge devices, in which an ML model is first trained in a highly controlled
Cloud environment and then downloaded to mobile devices for performing pre-
dictions, federated learning brings model training to the devices while supporting
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continuous learning on device. A unique feature of federated learning is to de-
couple the ability of conducting machine learning from the need of storing all
training data in a centralized location [17].
Although federated learning by design provides the default privacy of allow-
ing thousands of clients (e.g., mobile devices) to keep their original data on their
own devices, while jointly learn a model by sharing only local training parame-
ters with the server. Several recent research efforts have shown that the default
privacy in FL is insufficient for protecting the underlaying training data from pri-
vacy leakage attacks by gradient-based reconstruction [10,45,43]. By intercepting
the local gradient update shared by a client to the FL server before performing
federated averaging [28,25,17], the adversary can reconstruct the local training
data with high reconstruction accuracy, and hence intrudes the client privacy
and deceives the FL system by sneaking into client confidential training data
illegally and silently, making the FL system vulnerable to client privacy leakage
attacks (see Section 2.2 on Threat Model for detail).
In this paper, we present a principled framework for evaluating and compar-
ing different forms of client privacy leakage attacks. Through attack character-
ization, we present an in-depth understanding of different attack mechanisms
and attack surfaces that an adversary may leverage to reconstruct the private
local training data by simply analyzing the shared parameter updates (e.g., local
gradient or weight update vector). Through introducing multi-dimensional eval-
uation metrics and developing evaluation testbed, we provide a measurement
study and quantitative and qualitative analysis on how different configurations
of federated learning and different settings of the attack algorithm may impact
the success rate and the cost of the client privacy leakage attacks. Inspired by
the attack effect analysis, we present some mitigation strategies with prelimi-
nary results to highlight the importance of providing a systematic evaluation
framework for comprehensive analysis of the client privacy leakage threats and
effective mitigation methods in federated learning.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the overview
of the problem statement, including defining federated learning to establish some
terminology required for our attack analysis, the threat model that describes the
baseline assumptions about clients, FL server and adversaries, as well as the gen-
eral formulation of client privacy leakage attack. Section 3 describes three main
components of our evaluation framework: the impact of attack parameter config-
urations on attack effectiveness and cost, the impact of FL hyperparameter con-
figurations on attack effectiveness and cost, and the quantitative measurement
metrics for attack effect and cost evaluation. Section 4 reports the measurement
study and experimental analysis results on four benchmark image datasets. We
conclude the paper with related work and a summary.
2 Problem Formulation
2.1 Federated learning
In federated learning, the machine learning task is decoupled from the centralized
server to a set of N client nodes. Given the unstable client availability [27], for
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each round of federated learning, only a small subset of Kt < clients out of all
N participants will be chosen to participate in the joint learning.
Local Training at a Client: Upon notification of being selected at round
t, a client will download the global state w(t) from the server, perform a local
training computation on its local dataset and the global state, i.e., wk(t+ 1) =
wk(t) − η∇wk(t), where wk(t) is the local model parameter update at round t
and ∇w is the gradient of the trainable network parameters. Clients can decide
its training batch size Bt and the number of local iterations before sharing.
Update Aggregation at FL Server: Upon receiving the local updates
from all Kt clients, the server incorporates these updates and update its global
state, and initiates the next round of federated learning. Given that local updates
can be in the form of either gradient or model weight update, thus two update
aggregation implementations are the most representative:
Distributed SGD. At each round, each of the Kt clients trains the local
model with the local data and uploads the local gradients to the FL server. The
server iteratively aggregates the local gradients from all Kt clients into the global
model, and check if the convergence condition of FL task is met and if not, it
starts the next iteration round [23,24,40,41].
w(t+ 1) = w(t)− η
∑Kt
k=1
nt
n
∇wk(t),
where η is the global learning rate and ntn is the weight of client k. Here we adopt
the same notation as in reference [26] so that nk is the number of data points at
client k and n indicates the amount of total data from all participating clients
at round t.
Federated averaging. At each round, each of the Kt clients uploads the
local training parameter update to the FL server and the server iteratively per-
forms a weighted average of the received weight parameters to update the global
model, and starts the next iteration round t + 1 unless it reaches the conver-
gence [3,26].
w(t+ 1) =
∑Kt
k=1
nt
n
wk(t+ 1).
Let ∆wk(t) denote the difference between the model parameter update before
the iteration of training and the model parameter update after the training for
client k. Below is a variant of this method [11]:
w(t+ 1) = w(t) +
∑Kt
k=1
nt
n
∆wk(t).
Efficiency of FL Communication Protocol. The baseline communica-
tion protocol is used in many early federated learning implementations: the client
sends a full vector of local training parameter update back to the FL server in
each round. For federated training of large models on complex data, this step
is known to be the bottleneck of Federated Learning. The communication effi-
cient FL protocols have been proposed [26,19], which improves communication-
efficiency of parameter update sharing by employing high precision vector com-
pression mechanisms, such as structured updates and sketched updates. The
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former directly learns an update from a pre-specified structure, such as a low-
rank matrix and random masks. The latter compresses the learned full vector
of model parameter update to ensure a high compression ratio with a low-value
loss before sending it to the server.
Our framework will study the impact of different configurations of FL hyper-
parameters on the success rate and cost of privacy leakage attacks. For instance,
we will show that both baseline protocol and communication efficient protocol
(e.g., sketched updates) are vulnerable to client gradient leakage attacks (see
Section 3.2 and Section 4.2).
2.2 Threat Model
In an FL system, clients are the most vulnerable attack surface for the client
privacy leakage (CPL) attack because the client is the one sending its local
training parameter update to the FL server. We assume that clients can be
compromised in a limited manner: an adversary cannot gain access to the private
training data but may intercept the local parameter update to be sent to the FL
server and be able to access and run the saved local model executable (checkpoint
data) on the compromised client to launch white-box gradient leakage attack.
On the other hand, we assume that the federated server is honest but curious.
Namely, the FL server will honestly perform the aggregation of local parameter
updates and manage the iteration rounds for jointly learning. However, the FL
server may be curious and may analyze the periodic updates from certain clients
to perform client privacy leakage attacks and gain access to the private training
data of the victim clients. Given that the gradient-based aggregation and model
weight-based aggregation are mathematically equivalent, one can obtain the local
model parameter difference from the local gradient and the local training learning
rate. In this paper, gradient-based aggregation is used without loss of generality.
It is worth noting that even if the network connection between client and server
is secure, the client privacy leakage attack can happen on a compromised client
before the local parameter update is prepared for upload to the server.
Finally, distributed training can happen in either federated scenario with a
central server [22] or a decentralized scenario where clients are connected via a
peer to peer network [33]. In the decentralized setting, a client node will first per-
form the local computation to update its local model parameter and then sends
the updated gradients to its neighbor nodes. The client privacy leakage attack
can happen in both scenarios on the compromised client nodes. The federated
scenario is assumed in this paper.
2.3 The Client Privacy Leakage (CPL) Attack: An Overview
The client privacy leakage attack is a gradient-based feature reconstruction at-
tack, in which the attacker can design a gradient-based reconstruction learning
algorithm that will take the gradient update at round t, say ∇wk(t), to be
shared by the client, to reconstruct the private data used in the local training
computation. For federated learning on images or video clips, the reconstruction
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algorithm will start by using a dummy image of the same resolution as its at-
tack initialization seed, and run a test of this attack seed on the intermediate
local model, to compute a gradient loss using a vector distance loss function
between the gradient of this attack seed and the actual gradient from the client
local training. The goal of this reconstruction attack is to iteratively add crafted
small noises to the attack seed such that the generated gradient from this recon-
structed attack seed will approximate the actual gradient computed on the local
training data. The reconstruction attack terminates when the gradient of the
attack seed reconstructed from the dummy initial data converges to the gradi-
ent of the training data. When the gradient-based reconstruction loss function is
minimized, the reconstructed attack data will also converge to the training data
with high reconstruction confidence. Algorithm 1 gives a sketch of the client
privacy leakage attack method.
Algorithm 1 Gradient-based Reconstruction Attack
1: Inputs:
f(x;w(t)): Differentiable learning model, ∇wk(t): gradients produced by the local
training on private training data (x; y) at client k, w(t), w(t+1): model parameters
before and after the current local training on (x; y), ηk learning rate of local training
Attack configurations: INIT (x.type): attack initialization method, T: attack
termination condition, η′: attack optimization method, α: regularizer ratio.
2: Output: reconstructed training data (xrec; yrec)
3: Attack procedure
4: if wk(t+ 1): then
5: ∆wk(t)← wk(t+ 1)− w(t)
6: ∇wk(t)← ∆wk(t)ηk
7: end if
8: x0rec ← INIT(x.type)
9: yrec ← arg mini(∇iwk(t))
10: for τ in T do
11: ∇wτatt(t)← ∂loss(f(x
τ
rec,w(t)),yrec)
∂w(t)
12: Dτ ← ||∇wτatt(t)−∇wk(t)||2 + α||f(xτrec, w(t))− yrec||2
13: xτ+1rec ← xτrec − η′ ∂Dτ∂xτrec
14: end for
In Algorithm 1, line 4-6 convert the weight update to gradient when the
weight update is shared between the FL server and the client. The learning rate
ηk for local training is assumed to be identical across all clients in our prototype
system. Line 8 invokes the dummy attack seed initialization, which will be elab-
orated in Section 3.1. Line 9 is to get the label from the actual gradient shared
from the local training. Since the local training update towards the ground-truth
label of the training input data should be the most aggressive compared to other
labels, the sign of gradient for the ground-truth label of the private training
data will be different than other classes and its absolute value is usually the
largest. Line 10-14 presents the iterative reconstruction process that produces
the reconstructed private training data based on the client gradient update. If
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the reconstruction algorithm converges, then the client privacy leakage attack is
successful, and else the CPL attack is failed. Line 12-13 show that when the L2
distance between the gradients of the attack reconstructed data and the actual
gradient from the private training data is minimized, the reconstructed attack
data from the dummy seed converges to the private local training data, leading
to the client privacy leakage. In line 12, a label-based regularizer is utilized to
improve the stability of the attack optimization. An alternative way to recon-
struct the label of the private training data is to initialize a dummy label and
feed it into the iterative approximation algorithm for attack optimization [45],
in a similar way as the content reconstruction optimization. Figure 1 provides a
visualization of four illustrative example attacks over four datasets: LFW [15],
CIFAR100 [20], MNIST [21], and CIFAR10 [20].
Fig. 1: Example illustration of the Client Privacy Leakage attack
We make two interesting observations from Algorithm 1. First, multiple fac-
tors in the attack method could impact the attack success rate (ASR) of the
client privacy leakage attack, such as the dummy attack seed data initialization
method (line 8), the attack iteration termination condition (T), the selection of
the gradient loss (distance) function (line 12), the attack optimization method
(line 13). Second, the configuration of some hyperparameters in federated learn-
ing may also impact the effectiveness and cost of the CPL attack, including
batch size, training data resolution, choice of activation function, and whether
the gradient update is uploaded to the FL server using baseline communication
protocol or a communication efficient method. In the next section, we present
the design of our evaluation framework to further characterize the client privacy
leakage attack of different forms and introduce cost-effect metrics to measure and
analyze the adverse effect and cost of CPL attacks. By utilizing this framework,
we provide a comprehensive study on how different attack parameter configu-
rations and federated learning hyperparameter configurations may impact the
effectiveness of the client privacy leakage attacks.
3 Evaluation Framework
3.1 Attack Parameter Configuration
Attack Initialization: We first study how different methods for generating
the dummy attack seed data may influence the effectiveness of a CPL attack in
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terms of reconstruction quality or confidence as well as reconstruction time and
convergence rate. A straightforward dummy data initialization method is to use
a random distribution in the shape of dummy data type and we call this base-
line the random initialization (CPL-random). Although random initialization is
also used in [45,43,10], this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first study on
variations of attack initiation methods. To understand the role of random seed
in the CPL attack, it is important to understand the difference of the attack
reconstruction learning from the normal deep neural network (DNN) training.
In a DNN training, it takes as the training input both the fixed data-label pairs
and the initialization of the learnable model parameters, and iteratively learn
the model parameters until the training converges, which minimizes the loss
with respect to the ground truth labels. In contrast, the CPL attack performs
reconstruction attack by taking a dummy attack seed input data, a fixed set of
model parameters, such as the actual gradient updates of a client local training,
and the gradient derived label as the reconstructed label yrec, its attack algo-
rithm will iteratively reconstruct the local training data used to generate the
gradient, ∇wk(t), by updating the dummy synthesized seed data, following the
attack iteration termination condition T, denoted by {x0rec, x1rec, ...xsT} ∈ Rd,
such that the loss between the gradient of the reconstructed data xirec and the
actual gradient ∇wk(t) is minimized. Here x0rec denotes the initial dummy seed.
Theorem 1. (CPL Attack Convergence Theorem ) Let x∗rec be the opti-
mal synthesized data for f(x) and attack iteration t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...T}. Given the
convexity and Lipschitz-smoothness assumption, the convergence of the gradient-
based reconstruction attack is guaranteed with:
f(xTrec)− f(x∗rec) ≤
2L||x0rec − x∗rec||2
T
. (1)
The above CPL Attack Convergence theorem is derived from the well-established
Convergence Theorem of Gradient Descent [12]. Due to the limitation of space,
the formal proof of Theorem 1 is provided in the appendix. Note that the con-
vexity assumption is generally true since the d-dimension trainable synthesized
data can be seen as a one-hidden-layer network with no activation function. The
fixed model parameters are considered as the input with optimization of the
least square estimation problem as stated in Line 12 of Algorithm 1.
According to the CPL Attack Convergence Theorem, the convergence of the
CPL attack is closely related to the initialization of the dummy data x0rec. This
motivates us to investigate different ways to generate dummy attack seed data.
Concretely, we argue that different random seeds may have different impacts on
both reconstruction learning efficiency (confidence) and reconstruction learning
convergence (time or the number of iteration steps). Furthermore, using geo-
metrical initialization as those introduced in [32] not only can speed up the
convergence but also ensure attack stability. Consider a single layer of the neu-
ral network: g(x) = σ(wx + b), a geometrical initialization considers the form
g(x) = σ(w∗(x − b∗) instead of directly initialing w and b with random distri-
bution. For example, according to [42], the following partial derivative of the
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geometrical initialization.
∂g
∂w∗
= σ′(w∗(x− b∗))(x− b∗), (2)
is more independent from translation of the input space than ∂g∂w = σ
′(wx+ b)x,
and is therefore more stable.
Fig. 2: Visualization of different initialization
Figure 2 provides a visualization of five different initialization methods and
their impact on the CPL attack in terms of reconstruction quality and conver-
gence (#iterations). In addition to CPL-random, CPL-patterned is a method
that uses patterned random initialization. We initialize a small portion of the
dummy data with a random seed and duplicate it to the entire feature space.
An example of the portion can be 1/4 of the feature space. CPL-dark/light is
to use a dark (or light) seed of the input type (size), whereas CPL-R.G.B. is to
use red or green or blue solid color seed of the input type (size). CPL-optimal
refers to the theoretical optimal initialization method, which uses an example
from the same class as the private training data that the CPL attack aims to
reconstruct. We observe from Figure 2 that CPL-patterned, CPL-R.G.B., and
CPL-dark/light can outperform CPL-random with faster attack convergence and
more effective reconstruction confidence. We also include CPL-optimal to show
that different CPL initializations can effectively approximate the theoretical op-
timal initialization in terms of reconstruction effectiveness.
Figure 3 shows that the CPL attacks are highly sensitive to the choice of
random seeds. We conduct this set of experiments on LFW and CIFAR100 and
both confirm consistently our observations: different random seeds lead to di-
verse convergence processes with different reconstruction quality and confidence.
From Figure 3, we observe that even with the same random seed, attack with
patterned initialization is much more efficient and stable than the CPL-random.
Moreover, there are situations where the private label of the client training data
is successfully reconstructed but the private content reconstruction fails (see the
last row for both LFW and CIFAR100).
Attack Termination Condition: The effectiveness of a CPL attack is also
sensitive to the setting of the attack termination condition. Recall Section 2.3 and
Algorithm 1, there are two decision factors for termination. One is the maximum
attack iteration and the other is the L2-distance threshold of the gradient loss,
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(a) LFW (b) CIFAR100
Fig. 3: Effect of different random seed
i.e., the difference between the gradient from the reconstructed data and the
actual gradient from the local training using the private local data.
Consider the configuration of the maximum number of attack iterations, Ta-
ble 1 compares the six different settings of attack iteration termination condition.
It shows that when it is too small, such as 10 or 20, no matter how to optimize
the attack initialization method, the CPL attack will fail for all or most of the
datasets. However, when it is set to sufficiently larger, say 100 or 300, choos-
ing a good attack initialization method matters more significantly. For example,
CPL-patterned can get an attack success rate higher than the CPL-random for
all three datasets. Also, CPL-random shows unstable attack performance: For
LFW, it has slightly higher ASR when choosing the termination of 300 over that
of 100 iterations. However, for CIFAR10 and CIFAR100, it has significantly
higher ASR when choosing the termination of 300 iterations over that of 100.
This set of experiments also shows the good configuration of the total number
of termination iterations can be a challenging problem.
The second factor used for setting the attack termination condition is the
L2-distance threshold of the gradient difference between the reconstructed data
and the private local data. This factor is dataset-dependent, and our experiments
with the four benchmark datasets show that a L2-distance threshold, such as
0.0001, is a good option in terms of generalization.
maximum attack iteration 10 20 30 50 100 300
LFW
CPL-patterned 0 0.34 0.98 1 1 1
CPL-random 0 0 0 0.562 0.823 0.857
CIFAR10
CPL-patterned 0 0.47 0.93 0.973 0.973 0.973
CPL-random 0 0 0 0 0.356 0.754
CIFAR100
CPL-patterned 0 0 0.12 0.85 0.981 0.981
CPL-random 0 0 0 0 0.23 0.85
Table 1: Effect of termination condition Fig. 4: Effect of attack optimization
Gradient Loss (Distance) Function: In the CPL attack Algorithm 1, we use
L2 distance function as the gradient loss function. There are other alternative
vector distance functions, such cosine similarity, entropy, and so forth, can be
applied. [16] has studied the impact of different distance functions on training
efficiency. It shows that using some loss functions might lead to slower training,
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while others can be more robust to noise in the training set labeling and also
slightly more robust to noise in the input space.
Attack optimization: Optimization methods, such as Stochastic Gradient de-
scent [31], Momentum [30], Adam [18], and Adagrad [6] can be used to iteratively
update the dummy data during the reconstruction of a CPL attack. While the
first-order optimization techniques are easy to compute and less time consum-
ing, the second-order techniques are better in escaping the slow convergence
paths around the saddle points [4]. Figure 4 shows a comparison of L-BFGS [7]
and Adam and their effects on the CPL-patterned attack for LFW dataset. It
shows that choosing an appropriate optimizer can significantly improve attack
effectiveness. In the rest of the paper, L-BFGS is used in our experiments.
3.2 Hyperparameter Configurations in Federated learning
Batch size: Given that all forms of CPL attack methods are reconstruction
learning algorithms that iteratively learn to reconstruct the private training
data by inferencing over the actual gradient to perform iterative updates on
the dummy attack seed data, it is obvious that a CPL attack is most effective
when working with the gradient generated from the local training data of batch
size 1. Furthermore, when the input data examples in a batch of size B be-
longs to only one or two classes, which is often the case for mobile devices and
the non-i.i.d distribution of the training data [44], the CPL attacks can effec-
tively reconstruct the training data of the entire batch. This is especially true
when the dataset has low inter-class variation, e.g., face and digit recognition.
Figure 5 shows the visualization of performing a CPL-patterned attack on the
LFW dataset with four different batch sizes.
Fig. 5: Effect of batch size in CPL-patterned attacks on LFW
Training Data Resolution: In contrast to the early work [45] that fails to
attack images of resolution higher than 64× 64, we argue that the effectiveness
of the CPL attack is mainly attributed to the model overfitting to the training
data. In order to handle higher resolution training data, we double the number
of filters in all convolutional layers to build a more overfitted model. Figure 6
shows the scaling results of CPL attack on the LFW dataset with input data
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size of 32×32,64×64, and 128×128. CPL-random requires a much larger num-
ber of attack iterations in order to succeed the attack with high reconstruction
performance. CPL-patterned is a significantly more effective attack for all three
different resolutions with 3 to 4× reduction in the attack iterations compared
to CPL-random. We also provide an example of attacking the 512× 512 Indiana
University Chest X-Rays image of very high resolution in Figure 7.
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(d) MNIST
Fig. 8: Effect of activation function on the CPL attack
Activation Function: The next hyperparameter of FL is the activation func-
tion used in model training. We show that the performance of the CPL attacks
is highly related to the choice of the activation function. Figure 8 compares the
attack iterations and attack success rate of CPL-patterned attack with three
different activation functions: Sigmoid, Tanh, and LeakReLU. We observe that
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ReLU naturally prevents the full reconstruction of the training data using gra-
dient because the gradient of the negative part of ReLU will be 0, namely, that
part of the trainable parameters will stop responding to variations in error, and
will not get adjusted during optimization. This dying ReLU problem takes out
the gradient information needed for CPL attacks. In comparison, both Sigmoid
and Tanh are differentiable bijective and can pass the gradient from layer to
layer in an almost lossless manner. LeakyReLU sets a slightly inclined line for
the negative part of ReLU to mitigate the issue of dying ReLU and thus is
vulnerable to CPL attacks.
Motivated by the impact of activation function, we argue that any model com-
ponents that discontinue the integrity and uniqueness of gradients can hamper
CPL attacks. We observe from our experiments that an added dropout structure
enables different gradient in every query, making ∇wτatt(t) elusive and unable to
converge to the uploaded gradients. By contrast, pooling cannot prevent CPL
attacks since pooling layers do not have parameters.
Baseline v.s. Communication-efficient Protocols: We have discussed the
communication-efficient parameter update protocol using low-rank filers in Sec-
tion 2.3. As more FL systems utilize a communication-efficient protocol to re-
place the baseline protocol, it is important to study the impact of using a com-
munication efficient protocol on the performance of the CPL attacks, especially
compared to the baseline client-to-server communication protocol. In this set of
experiments, we measure the performance of CPL attacks under varying gradi-
ent compression percentage θ, i.e., θ percentage of the gradient update will be
discarded in this round of gradient upload. We employ the compression method
in [23] as it provides a good trade-off between communication-efficiency and
model training accuracy. It leverages sparse updates and sends only the im-
portant gradients, i.e., the gradients whose magnitude larger than a threshold,
and further measures are taken to avoid losing information. Locally, the client
will accumulate small gradients and only send them when the accumulation is
large enough. Figure 9 shows the visualization of the comparison on MNIST
and CIFAR10. We observe that compared to baseline protocol with full gradient
upload, using the communication efficient protocol with θ up to 40%, the CPL
attack remains to be effective at the maximum attack iterations of 26 with 100%
attack success rate for CIFAR10.
3.3 Attack Effect and Cost Metrics
Our framework evaluates the adverse effect and cost of CPL attacks using the
following metrics. For data-specific metrics, we average the evaluation results
over all successful reconstructions.
Attack success rate (ASR) is the percentage of successfully reconstructed
training data over the number of training data being attacked. We use ASRc
and ASRl to refer to the attack success rate on content and label respectively.
MSE uses the root mean square deviation to measure the similarity between
reconstructed input xrec and ground-truth input x:
1
M
∑M
i=1 (x(i)− xrec(i))2
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Fig. 9: Illustration of the CPL attack under communication-efficient update
when the reconstruction is successful. M denotes total number of features in
the input. MSE can be used on all data format such as attributes and text. A
smaller MSE means the more similar reconstructed data to the private ground
truth.
SSIM measures the structural similarity between two images based on a perception-
based model [39] that considers image degradation as perceived change.
SSIM(x, x′) =
(2µxµx′ + c1)(2σxx′ + c2)
(µ2x + µ
2
x′ + c1)(σ
2
x + σ
2
x′ + c2)
,
where µx and µx′ are the average of x and x
′, σ2x and σ
2
x′ are the variance of
x and x′. σxy is the covariance of x and x′. c1 = (k1L)2 and c2 = (k2L)2 are
two variables to stabilize the division with weak denominator. L is the dynamic
range of the pixel-values. k1 = 0.01 and k2 = 0.03 are constant by default. We
use SSIM to evaluate all image datasets. The closer SSIM to 1, the better the
attack quality in terms of image reconstruction. SSIM is designed to improve on
traditional methods such as MSE on image similarity.
Attack iteration measures the number of attack iterations required for recon-
struction learning to converge and thus succeed the attack, e.g., L2 distance of
the gradients between the reconstructed data and the local private training data
is smaller than a pre-set threshold.
4 Experiments and Results
4.1 Experiment Setup
We evaluate CPL attacks on four image datasets: MNIST, LFW, CIFAR10,
CIFAR100. MNIST consists of 70000 grey-scale hand-written digits images of
size 28×28. The 60000:10000 split is used for training and testing data. Labeled
Faces in the Wild (LFW) people dataset has 13233 images from 5749 classes.
The original image size is 250 × 250 and we slide it to 32 × 32 to extract the
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’interesting’ part. Our experiments only consider 106 classes, each with more
than 14 images. For a total number of 3735 eligible LFW data, a 3:1 train-test
ratio is applied. CIFAR10 and CIFAR100 each consists of 60000 color images of
size 32 × 32 with 10 classes and 100 classes respectively. The 50000:10000 split
is used for training and testing.
We perform CPL attacks with the following attack configurations as the de-
fault unless otherwise stated. The initialization method is patterned, the max-
imum attack iteration is 300, the optimization method is L-BFGS with attack
learning rate 1. The attack is performed with full gradient communication. For
each dataset, the attack is performed on 100 images with 10 different random
seeds. For MNIST and LFW, we use a LeNet model with 0.9568 benign accu-
racy on MNIST and 0.695 on LFW. For CIFAR10 and CIFAR100, we apply a
ResNet20 with benign accuracy of 0.863 on CIFAR10 and CIFAR100. We use
100 clients as the total client population and at each communication round, 10%
of clients will be selected randomly to participate in the federated learning.
4.2 Gradient Leakage Attack Evaluation
Comparison with other gradient leakage attacks. We first conduct a set
of experiments to compare the CPL-patterned attack with two existing gradi-
ent leakage attacks: the deep gradient attack [45], and the gradient inverting
attack [10], which replaces the L2 distance function with cosine similarity and
performs the optimization on the sign of the gradient. We first measure the at-
tack results on the four benchmark image datasets. Table 2 shows that CPL is a
much faster and more efficient attack with the highest attack success rate (ASR)
and lowest attack iterations on both content and label reconstruction for all four
datasets. Also, the very high SSIM and low MSE for CPL indicate the quality
of the reconstructed data is almost identical to the private training data. We
also observe that gradient inverting attack [10] can lead to high ASR compared
to deep gradient attack [45] using L2 distance but at a great cost of attack it-
erations. Note that CPL using L2 distance offers slightly higher ASR compared
to [10] but at much lower attack cost in terms of attack iterations required.
CIFAR10 CIFAR100 LFW MNIST
CPL [45] [10] CPL [45] [10] CPL [45] [10] CPL [45] [10]
attack iter 28.3 114.5 6725 61.8 125 6813 25 69.2 4527 11.5 18.4 3265
ASRc 0.973 0.754 0.958 0.981 0.85 0.978 1 0.857 0.974 1 0.686 0.784
ASRl 1 0.965 1 1 0.94 1 1 0.951 1 1 0.951 1
SSIM 0.9985 0.9982 0.9984 0.959 0.953 0.958 0.998 0.997 0.9978 0.99 0.985 0.989
MSE 2.2E-04 2.5E-04 2.2E-04 5.4E-04 6.5E-04 5.4E-04 2.2E-04 2.9E-04 2.3E-04 1.5E-05 1.7E-05 1.6E-05
Table 2: Comparison of Different Gradient Leakage Attacks
In addition, we include two attribute datasets: UCI Adult Income and Breast
Cancer Wisconsin in our comparison experiments. UCI Adult dataset includes
48842 records with 14 attributes such as age, gender, education, marital status,
occupation, working hours, and native country. The binary classification task is
to predict if a person makes over $50K a year based on the census attributes.
Breast Cancer Wisconsin has 569 records with 32 attributes that are computed
from a digitized image of a fine needle aspirate (FNA) of a breast mass. These
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features describe characteristics of the cell nuclei present in the image. The task
is to identify if the record indicates benign or malignant cancer. For two at-
tributes dataset, a multi-layer-perceptron with one hidden layer is used and has
an accuracy of 0.8646 on UCI Adult and 0.986 on Breast Cancer Wisconsin.
Categorical features in the two attribute datasets are processed with one-hot
encoding. Table 3 shows the results. For the breast cancer dataset, similar ob-
servation is found compared to Table 2. CPL is the most effective attack with
the highest ASR, and the gradient inverting attack [10] is the second with ASRc
of 78% and ASRl of 94%, compared to the deep gradient attack [45] with ASRc
of 35% and ASRl of 56%. For the UCI Adult dataset, all three have good and
similar attack performance.
UCI Adult CPL [45] [10] Breast Cancer CPL [45] [10]
ASRc 1 0.99 1 ASRc 1 0.35 0.78
ASRl 1 1 1 ASRl 1 0.56 0.94
MSE 1.82E-04 3.23E-04 4.97E-03 MSE 4.61E-04 6.15E-04 6.29E-04
Table 3: Comparison of gradient leakage attacks on two attribute datasets
Comparison with other training data inference attack. This set of exper-
iments compares client privacy leakage attacks with two existing training data
inference attacks: Melis et al [29] is based on membership-attack [34,35] and can
make partial property inference on a carefully selected subset of data. Aono et
al [2] is an attack that only works on the first layer of a multi-layer perceptron
and can synthesize data that is proportional to the private training data. Fig-
ure 10 shows the comparison result.As the gap of the MSE magnitude is too
large, the results are plotted in the log scale. It shows that the adverse effect
of the CPL attack is the most detrimental with the hightest SSIM and lowest
MSE, followed by Aono et al as the second, and Melis et al has much smaller
SSIM and much larger MSE, indicating the low attack inference quality.
0
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CIFAR10 CIFAR100 LFW MNIST
CPL-pattened Melis et al Aono et al
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Fig. 10: Comparison of CPL attack with Melis [29] and Aono [2]
Variation Study: Geometrical Initialization. This set of experiments mea-
sure and compare the four types of geometrical initialization methods: patterned
random, dark/light, RGB, and optimal. For optimal initialization, we feed a
piece of data that is randomly picked from the training set. This assumption is
reasonable when different clients hold part of the information about one data
item. Table 4 shows the result. We observe that the performance of all four
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geometrical initializations is always better than the random initialization. Note
that the optimal initialization is used in this experiment as a theoretical opti-
mal reference point as it assumes the background information about the data
distribution. Furthermore, the performance of geometrical initializations is also
dataset-dependent. CPL attack on CIFAR100 requires a longer time and more
iterations to succeed than CPL on CIFAR10 and LFW.
dataset
initialization baseline patterned dark/light RGB optimal
random 2*2 4*4 dark light R G B insider
CIFAR10
attack iter 91.14 28.3 24.8 34 52.3 35.9 77.5 79.1 23.2
ASR 0.871 0.973 0.976 0.99 1 0.99 0.96 0.96 1
CIFAR100
attack iter 125 61.8 57.2 57.5 65.3 59.4 61.3 62.4 35.3
ASR 1 0.981 0.995 1 1 1 0.88 1 1
LFW
attack iter 71.1 25 18.6 34 50.8 20.3 28 42.1 13.3
ASR 0.86 1 0.997 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 4: Comparison of different geometrical initialization in CPL attacks
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Fig. 11: Effect of Attack Initialization
attack iter variance avg min max variance
MNIST
CPL-patterned 11.5 7 19 3.844
CPL-random 18.4 13 65 12.27
LFW
CPL-patterned 25 18 125 14.32
CPL-random 69.2 53 186 25.87
CIFAR10
CPL-patterned 28.3 17 86 18.11
CPL-random 114.5 67 272 39.31
CIFAR100
CPL-patterned 61.8 24 133 25.3
CPL-random 125 70 240 41.2
Table 5: Variance of attack iterations
batch size 1 2 4 8 16
ASR 1 0.96 0.89 0.76 0.13
attack iter 25 25.7 25.6 26.1 25.7
SSIM 0.998 0.635 0.525 0.456 0.401
MSE 2.2E-04 6.7E-03 8.0E-03 9.0E-03 1.0E-02
(a) Effect of Batch size on CPL
local iter 1 3 5 7 9
attack iter 25 42.5 94.2 95.6 97.9
ASR 1 1 0.97 0.85 0.39
SSIM 0.998 0.981 0.898 0.659 0.471
MSE 2.2E-04 6.8E-04 1.8E-03 3.8E-03 5.5E-03
(b) Effect of local training iterations
Table 6: Effect of local training hyperparameters on CPL attack (LFW)
Figure 11 compares the four geometric initialization methods with respect to
the effectiveness of CPL attack on four benchmark datasets. Table 5 measures
the number of iterations to succeed the CPL attack in terms of average, min,
max, and variance for each of the four datasets. We observe from Figure 11
that the geometrical initialization can largely increase the attack success rate
in addition to faster attack convergence. Furthermore, the attack success rate
on the label reconstruction is consistently higher than the attack success rate
on content reconstruction, which further confirms the observation in Figure 3
(last row for LFW and CIFAR100). It indicates that separating the content
reconstruction attack and label reconstruction attack during the CPL attack
iterations, as done in CPL (Algorithm 1), is another factor contributing to high
success rate and low cost (fewer attack iterations) compared to optimizing the
content attack and label attack simultaneously [45] (recall Table 2 and Table 3).
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Variation Study: batch size and iterations. Motivated by the batch size
visualization in Figure 5, we study the impact of hyperparameters used in local
training, such as batch size and the number of local training iterations, on the
performance of the CPL attack. Table 6a shows the results of the CPL attack on
the LFW dataset with five different batch sizes. We observe that the ASR of CPL
attack is decreased to 96%, 89%, 76%, and 13% as the batch size increases to 2,
4, 8, and 16. The CPL attacks at different batch sizes are successful at the attack
iterations around 25 to 26 as we measure attack iterations only on successfully
reconstructed instances. Table 6b shows the results of the CPL attack under five
different settings of local iterations before sharing the gradient updates. We show
that as more iterations are performed at local training before sharing the gradient
update, the ASR of the CPL attack is decreasing with 97%, 85%, and 39% for
iterations of 5, 7, and 9 respectively. This inspires us to add hyperparameter
optimization as one of the mitigation strategies for evaluation in Section 4.3.
benign acc 0 1% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 70% 80% 90%
LFW 0.695 0.697 0.705 0.701 0.71 0.709 0.713 0.711 0.683 0.676
CIFAR100 0.67 0.673 0.679 0.685 0.687 0.695 0.689 0.694 0.676 0.668
CIFAR10 0.863 0.864 0.867 0.872 0.868 0.865 0.868 0.861 0.864 0.859
MNIST 0.9568 0.9567 0.9577 0.957 0.9571 0.9575 0.9572 0.9576 0.9573 0.9556
(a) Benign accuracy of four datasets with varying compression rates
L
F
W
compression original 1% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 70% 80% 90%
attack iter 25 25 24.9 24.9 25 24.8 25 24.6 24.5 300
ASR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
SSIM 0.998 0.9996 0.9997 0.9978 0.9978 0.9975 0.998 0.9981 0.951 0.004
MSE 2.2E-04 1.8E-04 1.7E-04 4.9E-04 4.8E-04 5.1E-04 4.5E-04 4.6E-04 1.6E-03 1.6E-01
C
IF
A
R
1
0
0 attack iter 61.8 61.8 61.8 61.7 61.7 61.5 61.8 60.1 59.8 300
ASR 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0
SSIM 0.959 0.9994 0.9981 0.9981 0.998 0.9983 0.9982 0.9983 0.895 0.016
MSE 5.4E-04 3.3E-04 3.7E-04 3.7E-04 3.8E-04 3.5E-04 3.6E-04 3.7E-04 1.5E-03 1.2E-01
C
IF
A
R
1
0 attack iter 28.3 28.3 28.1 26.5 25.8 25.3 300 300 300 300
ASR 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
SSIM 0.9985 0.9996 0.9996 0.9997 0.9992 0.87 0.523 0.0017 0.0019 0.0018
MSE 2.2E-04 1.3E-04 1.2E-04 1.2E-04 2.1E-04 3.1E-03 9.6E-03 3.3E-01 3.3E-01 3.3E-01
M
N
IS
T attack iter 11.5 11.5 11.2 10.7 7.2 300 300 300 300 300
ASR 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0
SSIM 0.99 0.9899 0.9891 0.9563 0.9289 0.8889 0.8137 0.425 0.433 0.43
MSE 2.4E-04 2.4E-04 2.2E-04 1.7E-03 8.8E-03 2.8E-02 5.8E-02 2.7E-01 2.7E-01 2.7E-01
(b) Attack performance of four datasets with varying compression rates
Table 7: Effect of CPL attack under communication-efficient FL protocols
Variation Study: Leakage in communication efficient sharing. This set
of experiments measures and compares the gradient leakage in CPL under base-
line protocol (full gradient sharing) and communication-efficient protocol (signifi-
cant gradient sharing with low-rank filer). Table 7 shows the result. To illustrate
the comparison results, we provide the accuracy of the baseline protocol and
the communication-efficient protocol of varying compression percentages on all
18 W. Wei et al.
four benchmark datasets in Table 7(a). We make two interesting observations.
(1) CPL attack can generate high confidence reconstructions (high ASR, high
SSIM, low MSE) for MNIST and CIFAR10 at compression rate 40%, and for
CIFAR100 and LFW at the compression rate of 90%. Second, as the compression
percentage increases, the number of attack iterations to succeed the CPL attack
decreases. This is because a larger portion of the gradients are low significance
and are set to 0 by compression. When the attack fails, it indicates that the
reconstruction cannot be done even with the infinite(∞) attack iterations, but
we measure SSIM and MSE of the failed attacks at the maximum attack itera-
tions of 300. (2) CPL attacks are more severe with more training labels in the
federated learning task. A possible explanation is that informative gradients are
more concentrated when there are more classes.
4.3 Mitigation Strategies
Motivated by our comprehensive analysis of CPL attacks of different forms,
we next evaluate two attack mitigation strategies: gradient perturbation and
gradient squeezing.
Gradient Perturbation with Additive Noise. We consider Gaussian noise
and Laplace noise with zero means and different magnitude of variance in this
set of experiments. Table 8 provides the mitigation results on CIFAR100 and
LFW. In both cases, the client privacy leakage attack is largely mitigated at
some cost of accuracy if we add sufficient Gaussian noise (G-10e-2) or Laplace
noise (L-10e-2), which causes small SSIM and large MSE, showing poor quality of
reconstruction attack. Visualization of two examples from each dataset is given
in Figure 12.
CIFAR100 LFW
Gaussian noise original G-10e-4 G-10e-3 G-10e-2 original G-10e-4 G-10e-3 G-10e-2
benign acc 0.67 0.664 0.647 0.612 0.695 0.692 0.653 0.636
attack iter 61.8 61.8 61.8 300 25 25 25 300
ASR 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
SSIM 0.9995 0.9976 0.8612 0.019 0.998 0.9976 0.8645 0.013
MSE 5.4E-04 6.9E-04 4.1E-03 3.0E-01 2.2E-04 3.7E-04 3.0E-03 1.9E-01
Laplace noise original L-10e-4 L-10e-3 L-10e-2 original L-10e-4 L-10e-3 L-10e-2
benign acc 0.67 0.651 0.609 0.578 0.695 0.683 0.632 0.597
attack iter 61.8 61.8 61.8 300 25 25 25 300
ASR 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0
SSIM 0.9995 0.9956 0.7309 0.017 0.998 0.9965 0.803 0.009
MSE 5.4E-04 6.4E-04 6.4E-03 3.1E-01 2.2E-04 4.0E-04 3.9E-03 2.0E-01
Table 8: Mitigation with Gaussian noise and Laplace noise
Gradient squeezing with controlled local training iterations. Instead
of sharing the gradient from the local training computation at each round t,
we schedule and control the sharing of the gradient only after M iterations
of local training. We perform CPL attack after each local iteration. Table 9
shows the results of varying M from 1 to 10 with step 1. It shows that as M
increases, the ASR of CPL attack starts to decrease, with 97.1%, 83.5%, 50%
and 29.2% for M = 3, 5, 8 and 10 respectively for CIFAR10, and with 100%,
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Fig. 12: Effect of additive noise on CPL-patterned attacks
C
IF
A
R
1
0 local iter 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
ASR 0.973 0.971 0.921 0.875 0.835 0.758 0.612 0.5 0.406 0.292
SSIM 0.9985 0.9981 0.997 0.956 0.915 0.901 0.893 0.822 0.748 0.715
MSE 2.2E-04 2.5E-04 2.9E-04 1.1E-03 2.4E-03 2.5E-03 2.7E-03 3.0E-03 4.5E-03 5.0E-03
attack iter 28.3 29.5 31.6 35.2 42.5 71.5 115.3 116.3 117.2 117.5
C
IF
A
R
1
0
0 ASR 0.981 0.977 0.958 0.949 0.933 0.893 0.842 0.78 0.557 0.437
SSIM 0.9959 0.996 0.996 0.959 0.907 0.803 0.771 0.666 0.557 0.505
MSE 5.4E-04 5.8E-04 6.9E-04 1.1E-03 1.7E-03 2.2E-03 3.5E-03 4.2E-03 6.4E-03 6.9E-03
attack iter 61.8 63.8 66.5 72.4 78.3 95.3 113.7 114.1 114.3 114.4
L
F
W
ASR 1 1 1 1 0.97 0.91 0.85 0.78 0.39 0.07
SSIM 0.998 0.996 0.981 0.976 0.898 0.811 0.659 0.573 0.471 0.41
MSE 2.2E-04 4.3E-04 6.8E-04 8.6E-04 1.8E-03 2.8E-03 3.8E-03 4.3E-03 5.5E-03 6.5E-03
attack iter 25 34.7 42.5 68.3 94.2 95.5 95.6 98.3 97.9 98.1
M
N
IS
T ASR 1 0.82 0.57 0.44 0.25 0.06 0 0 0 0
SSIM 0.99 0.982 0.974 0.963 0.954 0.935 0.583 0.576 0.581 0.574
MSE 1.5E-05 2.3E-04 2.8E-04 1.2E-03 1.5E-03 2.4E-03 1.7E-02 1.7E-02 1.7E-02 1.7E-02
attack iter 11.5 34.7 93.2 96.7 97.1 96.5 300 300 300 300
Table 9: Mitigation with controlled local training iterations
97%, 78% and 7% for M = 3, 5, 8 and 10 respectively for LFW. This preliminary
mitigation study shows that clients in federated learning may adopt some attack
resilient optimizations when configuring their local training hyperparameters.
An example of gradient squeezing with controlled local training iterations is
provided in Figure 13.
5 Related work
Privacy in federated learning has been studied in two contexts: training-phase
privacy attacks and prediction-phase privacy attacks. Gradient leakage attacks,
formulated in CPL of different forms, or those in literature [10,45,43], are one
type of privacy exploits in the training phase. In addition, Aono et al [2,1]
proposed a privacy attack, which partially recovers private data based on the
proportionality between the training data and the gradient updates in multi-
layer perceptron models. However, their attack is not suitable for convolutional
neural networks because the size of the features is far larger than the size of
convolution weights. Hitaj et al [14] poisoned the shared model by introducing
mislabeled samples into the training. In comparison, gradient leakage attacks
are more aggressive since client privacy leakage attacks make no assumption on
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Fig. 13: Effect of local training on CPL-patterned attacks using LFW
direct access to the training data as those in training poisoning attacks and yet
can compromise the private training data by reconstruction attack based on only
the local parameter updates to be shared with the federated server.
Privacy exploits at the prediction phase include model inversion, member-
ship inference, and GAN-based reconstruction attack [13,14,38]. Fredrikson et
al [8] proposed the model inversion attack to exploit confidence values revealed
along with predictions. Ganju et al [9] infers the global properties of the training
data from a trained white-box fully connected neural network. Membership at-
tacks [34,29,36] exploit the statistical differences between the model prediction
on its training set and the prediction on unseen data to infer the membership of
training data with high confidence.
6 Conclusion
We have presented a principled framework for evaluating and comparing dif-
ferent forms of client privacy leakage attacks. We show how adversaries can
reconstruct the private local training data by simply analyzing the shared pa-
rameter update (e.g., local gradient or weight update vector). We identify and
analyze the impact of different attack configurations and different hyperparam-
eter settings of federated learning on client privacy leakage attacks. Extensive
experiments on four benchmark datasets highlight the importance of providing
a systematic evaluation framework for an in-depth understanding of the various
forms of client privacy leakage threats in federated learning and for developing
and evaluating different mitigation strategies.
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7 Appendices
7.1 Proof of Theorem 1
Assumption 1 (Convexity) we say f(x) is convex if
f(αx+ (1− α)x′) ≤ αf(x) + (1− α)f(x′), (3)
where x, x′ are data point in Rd, and α ∈ [0, 1].
Lemma 1. If a convex f(x) is differentiable, we have:
f(x′)− f(x) ≥ 〈∇f(x), x′ − x〉. (4)
Proof. Equation 3 can be rewritten as:
f(x′ + α(x− x′))− f(x′)
α
≤ f(x)− f(y).
When α→ 0, we complete the proof.
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Assumption 2 (Lipschitz Smoothness) With Lipschitz continuous on the
differentiable function f(x), we have:
||∇f(x)−∇f(x′) ≤ L||x− x′||, (5)
where L is called Lipschitz constant.
Lemma 2. If f(x) is Lipschitz-smooth, we have:
f(xt+1)− f(xt) ≤ − 1
2L
||∇f(xT )||22 (6)
Proof. Using the Taylor expansion of f(x) and the uniform bound over Hessian
matrix, we have
f(x′) ≤ f(x) + 〈∇f(x), x′ − x〉+ L
2
||x′ − x||22. (7)
By inserting x′ = x− 1L∇f(x) into equation 5 and equation 7, we have:
f(x− 1
L
∇f(x))− f(x) ≤ − 1
L
〈∇f(x),∇f(x)〉+ L
2
|| 1
L
∇f(x)||22
= − 1
2L
||∇f(x)||22
Lemma 3. (Co-coercivity) A convex and Lipschitz-smooth f(x) satisfies:
〈∇f(x′)−∇f(x), x′ − x〉 ≥ 1
L
||∇f(x′)−∇f(x)|| (8)
Proof. Due to equation 5,
〈∇f(x′)−∇f(x), x′ − x〉 ≥ 〈∇f(x′)−∇f(x), 1
L
(∇f(x′)−∇f(x))〉
=
1
L
||∇f(x′)−∇f(x)||
Then we can proof the attack convergence theorem: f(xT )−f(x∗) ≤ 2L||x0−x∗||2T .
Proof. Let f(x) be convex and Lipschitz-smooth. It follow that
||xt+1 − x∗||22 = ||xt − x∗ −
1
L
∇f(xt)||22
= ||xt − x∗||22 − 2
1
L
〈xt − x∗,∇f(xt)〉+ 1
L2
||∇f(xt)||22
≤ ||xt − x∗||22 −
1
L2
||∇f(xt)||22 (9)
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Equation 9 holds due to equation 8 in lemma 3. Recall equation 6 in lemma 2,
we have:
f(xt+1)− f(x∗) ≤ f(xt)− f(x∗)− 1
2L
||∇f(xt)||22. (10)
By applying convexity,
f(xt)− f(x∗) ≤ 〈∇f(xt), xt − x∗〉
≤ ||∇f(xt)||2||xt − x∗||
≤ ||∇f(xt)||2||x1 − x∗||. (11)
Then we insert equation 11 into equation 10:
f(xt+1)− f(x∗) ≤ f(xt)− f(x∗)− 1
2L
1
||x1 − x∗||2 (f(x
t)− f(x∗))2
⇒ 1
f(xt)− f(x∗) ≤
1
f(xt+1)− f(x∗) − β
f(xt)− f(x∗)
f(xt+1)− f(x∗) (12)
⇒ 1
f(xt)− f(x∗) ≤
1
f(xt+1)− f(x∗) − β (13)
⇒ β ≤ 1
f(xt+1)− f(x∗) −
1
f(xt)− f(x∗) , (14)
where β = 12L
1
||x1−x∗||2 . Equation 12 is done by divide both side with (f(x
t+1)−
f(x∗))(f(xt)− f(x∗)) and Equation 13 utilizes f(xt+1)− f(x∗) ≤ f(xt)− f(x∗).
Then, following by induction over t = 0, 1, 2, ..T − 1 and telescopic cancellation,
we have
Tβ ≤ 1
f(xT )− f(x∗) −
1
f(x0)− f(x∗) ≤
1
f(xT )− f(x∗) .
Tβ ≤ 1
f(xT )− f(x∗) −
1
f(x0)− f(x∗) ≤
1
f(xT )− f(x∗) (15)
⇒ T
2L
1
||x1 − x∗||2 ≤
1
f(xT )− f(x∗) (16)
⇒ f(xT )− f(x∗) ≤ 2L||x
0 − x∗||2
T
. (17)
Thus complete the proof.
